When the Family Court hands down a judgment that quietly but powerfully illustrates how financial remedy law works in practice—especially when one party refuses to engage—it deserves attention. Jessica Vlijter v Cornell Lloyd Vlijter [2025] EWFC 458 (B), heard in Watford before Deputy District Judge Brooks KC, is exactly that kind of case.
Although not a precedent, the judgment is a textbook example of how the court balances needs, fairness, and conduct when one spouse simply opts out of the process.
A Long Marriage, a One‑Sided Battle
Jessica and Cornell Vlijter lived together from 2002, married in 2011, and separated in 2020. With three children—two still dependent—their 18‑year relationship was unquestionably a long marriage. But from the moment financial remedy proceedings began, only one party showed up.
Cornell filed no Form E, attended no hearings, and ignored court directions. Enquiry agents confirmed he was alive, well, and living locally. He even acknowledged receiving court papers—albeit cryptically, by writing “101” on the envelope, a nod to Orwell’s 1984. But participation? None.
This left Jessica to shoulder the entire burden of disclosure, evidence, and the day‑to‑day financial care of the children.
The Court’s Approach: Evidence, Inference, and Fairness
With only Jessica giving evidence, the judge relied on her testimony—found to be credible—and on the court’s ability to draw adverse inferences where appropriate.
Key findings included:
- Jessica earns around £80,000; Cornell historically earned at least 25% more.
- Jessica has been the sole domestic and primary financial contributor since separation.
- Cornell agreed to pay £900/month toward family expenses but fell into arrears of £20,700.
- The only significant asset is the former matrimonial home, valued at £550,000 with £340,000 equity.
- Jessica can raise a mortgage of £323,000; Cornell, earning more, could raise at least £400,000.
The judge accepted that Jessica’s housing needs—especially with two dependent children—were met only by remaining in the family home. Cornell, who has no contact with the children, required far less.
Litigation Misconduct: A Costly Silence
The court was clear: Cornell’s refusal to engage amounted to litigation misconduct.
This was not a complex case. It should not have required three hearings. Jessica incurred £12,000 in costs that the judge ordered Cornell to pay—an unusual but justified departure from the “no order as to costs” norm in family cases.
The Outcome: A Needs‑Based Departure from Equality
Although the starting point in long marriages is equal sharing, the court departed significantly from 50/50.
Why?
- Jessica’s greater housing need
- Cornell’s higher earning capacity
- Jessica’s ongoing responsibility for the children
- Cornell’s minimal post‑separation contribution
- His ability to rehouse with a smaller deposit and larger mortgage
The judge awarded Cornell 25% of the equity—£85,000—but then deducted:
- £20,000 unpaid maintenance
- £12,000 litigation costs
Leaving a final lump sum of £53,000.
Jessica keeps the home (subject to a mortgage of around £230,000). Cornell walks away with £53,000 and the ability to secure a mortgage of up to £400,000—more than enough to meet his assessed housing need.
A clean break was ordered.
A Judgment with a Quiet Warning
This case is a reminder that:
- Non‑participation is not a strategy.
Courts will proceed without you, and the outcome may be far less favourable. - Needs drive outcomes.
Especially where children are involved. - Litigation conduct matters.
Silence can be expensive. - Informal agreements are not binding.
The couple had once agreed a very different settlement privately. Without a consent order, it carried no weight.
Final Thoughts
Vlijter v Vlijter is not a headline‑grabbing case, but it is a powerful illustration of how the Family Court deals with absent parties, unmet obligations, and the practical realities of post‑separation life.